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ABSTRACT
Organizations today gather unprecedented quantities of data from their operations.
This data is coming from transactions made by a person or from a connected
system/application. From personal devices to industry including government, the
internet has become the primary means of modern communication, further increasing
the need for a method to track and secure these devices. Protecting the integrity of
connected devices collecting data is critical to ensure the trustworthiness of the
system. An organization must not only know the identity of the users on their
networks and have the capability of tracing the actions performed by a user but they
must trust the system providing them with this knowledge. This increase in the pace
of usage of personal devices along with a lack of trust in the internet has driven
demand for trusted digital identities. As the world becomes increasingly mobile with
the number of smart phone users growing annually and the mobile web flourishing, it
is critical to implement strong security on mobile devices. To manage the vast number
of devices and feel confident that a machine’s identity is verifiable, companies need to
deploy digital credentialing systems with a strong root of trust. As passwords are not a
secure method of authentication, mobile devices and other forms of IoT require a
means of two-factor authentication that meets NIST standards. Traditionally, this has
been done with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) through the use of a smart card.
Blockchain technologies combined with PKI can be utilized in such a way as to
provide an identity and access management solution for the internet of things (IoT).
Improvements to the security of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology
and various implementations of blockchain make viable options for managing the
identity and access of IoT devices. When PKI first began over two decades ago, it
required the use of a smart card with a set of credentials known as the personal
identity verification (PIV) card. The PIV card (something you have) along with a
personal identification number (PIN) (something you know) were used to implement
two-factor authentication. Over time the use of the PIV cards has proven challenging
as mobile devices lack the integrated smart card readers found in laptop and desktop

Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework
computers. Near Field Communication (NFC) capability in most smart phones and
mobile devices provides a mechanism to allow a PIV card to be read by a mobile
device. In addition, the existing PKI system must be updated to meet the demands of a
mobile focused internet. Blockchain technology is the key to modernizing PKI.
Together, blockchain-based PKI and NFC will provide an IoT solution that will allow
industry, government, and individuals a foundation of trust in the world wide web that
is lacking today.
Keywords—Blockchain technology, Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM), Internet of
Things (IoT), Mobile Devices, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Near Field Communication (NFC),
smart card.
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CHAPTER 1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background of the Problem
Despite almost all of our daily activities involving the internet, the internet has no

trusted digital identity (Stokkink & Pouwelse, 2018). Currently, cyberspace is the one domain
a person can literally be anything or anyone they choose. Social media accounts are selfsovereign meaning the user controls their credentials. The user creates a name, a birthdate,
address, and career. Some are authentic. Some are fake. There is no way to validate a person
is who they say they are in a self-sovereign system. In an ideal world, we would all trust each
other. In the world as we know it, we are constantly bombarded with phishing emails, fake
websites, and other forms of social engineering to scam us in one way or another. Across the
globe more than two out of five consumers have been the victim to a fraudulent online
incident. The United States (US) has the highest rates when compared to the rest of the world.
Over fifty percent of businesses worldwide saw an increase in fraud over the last year, while
over eighty percent of US businesses reported an increase (Experian, 2019). Individuals,
businesses, and government have a strong desire and need for trusted digital identities
(Stokkink & Pouwelse, 2018).
Most online identity verification is done through the use of a password. Passwords are
a form of single factor authentication (SFA) which means only one method of identifying an
individual’s request for access is given. Passwords are used for logging into social media
accounts, bank accounts, email accounts, and online shopping accounts. We are encouraged to
use a strong password and make it unique for every online service. Most major industry such
as governments, Universities, and financial institutions follow the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines regarding secure passwords. These guidelines
typically required strong passwords with a minimum length of fourteen characters that are a
combination of letters, numbers and special characters. Despite password creation
requirements, passwords remain weak and easily deducible because people continue to use
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predictable patterns and common words, such as names and birth dates (L. Bosnjak, 2018).
There are many limitations on passwords or single-factor authentication such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Password Capture –there are many methods of obtaining passwords.
Keylogger malware – captures a user’s keystrokes.
Social engineering to manipulate a person’s password through phishing emails, fake
websites, social networks, phone calls, or other similar methods.
Gaining access to unencrypted or weakly encrypted stored passwords.
Passwords that are written down.
Password Guessing – Using default passwords, dictionary words, and other probable
passwords over and over to attempt authentication.
Password Cracking – Using analysis and cryptographic password hashes to reveal the
password.
Password Resetting – Using interception or manipulation to reset a user’s existing
password (Ferraiolo, Cooper, Regenscheid, Scarfone, & Souppaya, 2016).
These are all reasonable threats that a hacker can exploit to obtain unauthorized access

to a system or network and have that users’ rights. Most hackers target administrators and
others who have high level privileges in a system in order to be most effective with their
attack because once an attacker has gained access into a system, the practice is similar every
time:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Establish continued access.
Escalate or obtain administrator privileges.
Network mapping.
Port scanning to find open ports.
Locate valued data – sometimes hard to determine and sometimes already known what
to look for.
Retrieve the data.
Remain undetected for as long as possible (Verizon, 2019).
In 2018, approximately 330 million Twitter accounts had their passwords exposed in

plain text, GOMO app had the information of approximately 50.5 million users exposed on a
publicly accessible server via port 80 with no login requirement, and 1.5 million medical
records were exposed from a password hacking breach (ENISA, 2019). According to studies
conducted by Crowd Research Partners in 2018, the most common culprit of insider threat is
accidental exposure by employees. They found the accidental breeches were due 56% to weak
or reused passwords, no passwords accounted for 44%, and password sharing practices
accounted for 44% for insider threats (Crowd Research Partners, 2019). Hacktivists, people
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who gain unauthorized access computer files or networks in order to further social or political
ends, used SQL injection, unpatched system vulnerabilities, and password stealing as their
main techniques to hack a website. LokiPWS, a webbot used as a password stealer,
distribution increased by more than 300% and data breaches increased by 28% in 2018
(ENISA, 2019). Then there are other well-known password stealers such as Mimikatz
(WatchGuard, 2018). Last year, one could find approximately 500,000 email accounts with
passwords that were priced at US $90 in the Dark Web (ENISA, 2019).
The events of 2018 reveal that re-using the same password in various services is a
serious security issue and should be avoided. It is also evident that passwords are not the
optimal method of preventing entry. We have long been aware of password weakness. Back
in 2012, LinkedIn lost 117 million passwords hashed with SHA-1. This stimulated a thorough
analysis of how government and military employees use passwords compared to other
organizations by WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. Government employees are considered to
follow strong password practices typically greater than the rest of the population. For this
study, the Security Analysts used the 55 million hashes obtained from the 117 million leaked
and using the well-known dictionary realuniq.lst from CrackStation.net were able to crack
52% of them. Out of these they accounted for government addresses based on their emails
identified by “.gov” or “.mil” and were able to crack 50% of them in under two days. The
results determined that government and military users were only 2% better at picking strong
passwords than non-government and military users (WatchGuard, 2018).
The cognizance of password weakness has become so popular that NIST made some
controversial changes to their password guidelines with the release of Special Publication
800-63-3. They basically stated to try not to use passwords at all. NIST removed the periodic
password change requirements as well as the password complexity requirement of mixing
letters (upper & lower case), symbols, and numbers (Paul A. Grassi, 2017). Password-only
authentication is not adequate for an application; therefore, it is recommended to use it in
combination with other security mechanisms. The European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA) recommends enabling two factor-authentication whenever
applicable as two factor-authentication can prevent account takeover (ENISA, 2019). Twofactor authentication can mitigate or lessen the exposure to lost or stolen passwords (Verizon,
2018). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has sustained itself over the past 20 years as the de
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facto standard for providing electronic trust via two-factor authentication (2FA) for desktop
and other stationary devices (Ragjendran, 2017).
1.2

Statement of the problem
The pace of usage of personal devices has increased within industry, driving demand

for trusted digital identities. As the world becomes increasingly mobile with the number of
smart phone users growing annually and the mobile web flourishing, it is critical to implement
strong security on mobile devices. As passwords and OTPs are not a secure method of
authentication, mobile devices and other forms of IoT require a means of two-factor
authentication that meet NIST standards. When PKI first began over two decades ago, it
required the use of a smart card with a set of credentials known as the personal identity
verification (PIV) card. The PIV card (something you have) along with a personal
identification number (PIN) (something you know) were used to implement two-factor
authentication. Over time the use of the PIV cards has proven challenging as mobile devices
lack the integrated smart card readers found in laptop and desktop computers. In addition, the
existing PKI system must be updated to meet the demands of a mobile focused internet.
1.3

Objectives of the project
The objectives of this project are to update the existing PKI framework to provide a

secure means of authentication utilizing the PIV card when accessed from a mobile device.
Currently, non-mobile electronics utilize Public Key Infrastructure as a method of 2FA. A
USB smartcard reader allows those sitting in front of a laptop or desktop computer the
capability of providing 2FA. Utilizing the near field communication (NFC) functionality built
into most smart phones provides a method to develop authenticating with something you have
and something you know from a mobile device meeting the requirements of 2FA. The NFC
capabilities within smartphones allows an adequate replacement for USB smartcard readers.
Improving on the existing centralized PKI framework by decentralizing it through blockchain
technology, a new PKI framework will provide a secure method of authentication. This
research will answer the question on how PKI can be improved to provide a trusted digital
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identity for mobile devices. The research will break down the overarching question to find
answers to these questions:
Digital Identity
•
•
•
•

Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the digital
identity?
Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity?
Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not counterfeit or
spoofed)?
Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world?
NFC

•
•
•
•
•
•

Can the encryption size be reduced to fit on an NFC card?
Can a smartphone with NFC enabled be a smart card reader?
Is there a secure communication channel between the card and device?
What drain is there on the battery life?
Can the existing standard PKCS #11 which specifies an interface to cryptographic smart
cards be used?
Can the existing standard PKCS #12 which specifies a format that allows storing and
transferring security-sensitive data such as private keys and certificates be used?
Blockchain

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Can PKI become a distributed system with blockchain?
Can blockchain allow separate PKI systems to function as one?
Can blockchain perform identity brokering?
Can PKI systems from competitors be trusted?
Can PKI provide a trusted identity for the internet?
Can blockchain provide a trusted third-party certification authority?
Can the size of the blockchain be hosted by enough peers?
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CHAPTER 2
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

AUTHENTICATION
In order to ensure that a user on a network is genuine, there must be a method of

identifying them. The data being transferred across a network as well as the systems on a
network need to be identified as well. Origin, destination, time of transmission/reception,
content and so on are data items requiring integrity preservation (Batten, 2012). The process
of ensuring trust in a user, system, or data is called authentication. An authentication factor is
a way of confirming the identity of a subject. The three authentication factors are “something
you know”, “something you have”, and “something you are.” “something you know” is
defined as an item that the subject has knowledge of, “something you have” is an item that is
in the possession of the subject, and “something you are” is a biometric characteristic of the
subject. Single-factor authentication is the act of identifying a user as authentic with one out
of three of the authentication factors. Two-factor authentication is the act of identifying a user
as authentic with two out of three of the authentication factors. Multi-factor authentication is
the act of identifying a user as authentic using all three authentication factors. The more
authentication factors used for authentication the stronger the security and trust in the
subject’s identity (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011).
2.2

DIGITAL IDENTITY
The built-in anonymity of cyberspace makes identity one of the largest challenges that

cybersecurity experts face (Rivera, Robledo, Larios, & Avalos, 2017). Managing and having
trust in the identity of a user is desired knowledge by governments, industry, and individuals.
In the technologically rooted social and business environments of the modern world, identity
can be faked or impersonated. People want to know that the cute person they have been
chatting with on social media or flirting with on dating sites is who they say they are. People
want to trust that the email they just opened is really from their bank as it claims. Industry and
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governments want to know that the person they allowed onto their network or access to their
websites is who they say they are. A digital identity sometimes referred to as an electronic
identification (eID) is the cyberspace equivalent to a person or entities real life identity. An
entity can be industry, government, or a thing. Basically, anything that connects to a network
requires a digital identity. The Oxford Dictionary (Oxford, 2019) defines identity as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The fact of being who or what a person or thing is.
The characteristics determining who or what a person or things is.
[as modifier] (of an object) serving to establish who the holder, owner, or wearer is by
bearing their name and often other details such as a signature or photograph.
A close similarity or affinity
(also identity operation)
An element of a set which, if combined with another element by a specified binary
operation, leaves that element unchanged.
The equality of two expressions for all values of the quantities expressed by letters, or
an equation expressing this, e.g. (x+1)2 = x2 + 2x + 1.

Therefore, a digital identity can be expressed as the fact of being who or what a person or
thing is online. A digital identity is the characteristics determining who or what a person or
thing is online. Or serving to establish who the holder, owner, or wearer is by bearing their
name and often other details such as a signature or photograph online.
2.3

Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of securing data. There is a long history throughout the

centuries of obscuring messages to prevent unwanted parties from reading them. The process
of encoding a message in such a way that makes it unreadable to those not authorized is called
encryption. Modern cryptography is founded on mathematical theory and computer science
principles. The purpose of cryptography is to prove three fundamental things about a
message: authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. Authentication proves that a message
was sent by who claims to have sent it. Integrity proves that a message has not been altered in
unauthorized ways. Confidentiality proves that a message is read by only those intended to
read it (Batten, 2012).
There are two forms of cryptography: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric
cryptography is a method of encryption where the sender and receiver share the same key.
Symmetric cryptography utilizes simpler and faster encryption but requires securely
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exchanging the key which becomes a challenge. Asymmetric cryptography uses a public and
private key to encrypt and decrypt data. The public key can be shared with anyone. The
private key is known only to owner (Paar & Pelzl, 2010).
2.4

Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is the same as asymmetric cryptography. The two terms can

be used interchangeably. Public key cryptography began in 1976 with a paper publication by
Whit Diffie and Martin Hellman describing a method of establishing a common key in a
secure manner over an insecure channel (Paar & Pelzl, 2010).
Each entity (person or device) that uses public-key cryptography has a key pair that
consists of a public key and a private key. Private keys are secret and known only to their
owners. They are protected by a passphrase and can be stored on separate hardware
cryptographic devices such as smart cards. Private keys are used for proving the identity of
the entity. Public keys are made known openly and are distributed to all hosts with which the
entity wants to securely communicate. The two keys are mathematically dependent but the
private key cannot be derived from the public key. The data encrypted with the public key can
only be decrypted with the private key and vice versa. Since the public key is shared freely a
method to ensure the authenticity of the public key is created through a public key certificate.
A public key certificate is an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public
key. This ensures trust that the public key belongs to the entity it is associated with. This is
most commonly done using the X.509 standard. X.509 is a standard defining the format of the
digital certificates used to validate ownership of a public key. This standard allows
interoperability among numerous tools and applications among vendors (Adams & Lloyd,
2003).
Digital Certificate
Digital certificates are electronic credentials that binds a user, computer, or service’s
identity to a public key by providing information about the subject of the certificate, the
validity of the certificate, and applications and services that can use the certificate. Digital
certificates can be used for authentication, encryption, and digital signing. Certificates issued
in PKIs are structured to meet these objectives based on standards established by the Public-
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Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group (PKIX) of the Internet Engineering Tasks Force
(IETF) (Adams & Lloyd, 2003).
Root Certificate
The root certificate is the foundation of trust for PKI which is why it is also called the
root of trust. In order for a certificate to be trusted it must originate from a trusted source. A
certificate is signed by a root certificate issued by a program run under strict guidelines. Many
well-known root certificates are distributed in operating systems such as Microsoft and Apple.
A root certificate is invaluable because any certificate signed with its private key is
automatically trusted (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2017).
X.509 Certificate
X.509 is a standard defining the most commonly used format of public key certificates
through a series of Requests for Comments (RFC). X.509 for PKI follows RFC 5280. Each
root CA will have a trusted root certificate that is used to sign each key pair generated for
participates in the PKI system. The X.509 certificate for PIV authentication and its associated
private key is defined in FIPS 201 and is used to authenticate the card and the cardholder. The
PIV authentication private key and its corresponding certificate are accessed solely over the
contact interface. The control rule for read access is set so that the certificate can always be
read without any access control restrictions. This cryptographic function is protected with a
PIN. Without a verified PIN submission there can be no private key operations using the PIV
Authentication key. The X.509 certificate for digital signature and its associated private key
support the use of digital signatures such as that utilized for signing documents.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A message authentication code (MAC) is used for data integrity. A MAC provides a
cryptographic checksum that is computed by the sender and appended to the message. The
receiver will compute a MAC and compare the MAC computed to the MAC attached to the
message. If they are the same, data integrity can be trusted. If they differ, the data has been
tampered with in some way (Paar & Pelzl, 2010). Although this technique employs symmetric
encryption, it depends on a shared key known to both the sender and receiver. Therefore,
public key cryptography can be used to compute this shared key (Adams & Lloyd, 2003).
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Digital Signature
A digital signature is a means of identifying the sender of a digital message similar to
the way a written signature on a paper or document proves authorship. Using public key
cryptography, a sender, Bill, uses his private key to digitally sign a message. The receiver,
Jill, uses Bill’s public key to confirm the messages signature so that she can trust it came from
Bill. If Bill wants to send a private message to Jill, Bill encrypts the message with Jill’s public
key. Only Jill can decrypt the message with her private key ensuring that only Jill reads the
message. Bill digitally signs the message with his private key so that Jill can assure herself the
message came from Bill. This is how public key cryptography allows a means of
authenticating the identity of each other (Batten, 2012).
2.5

Smart Cards
A smart card is a piece of plastic with a microprocessor that can read and write data,

contain a unique identifier, be used to process transactions, and add security. These cards are
read by a smart card reader. The first plastic cards utilized a magnetic strip. The magnetic
strip could be seen on every credit and debit card but their use has been replaced with a smart
card that has a chip (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2017). Today’s credit and debit cards have
implemented a chip in addition to the magnetic strip. The smart card that contains a chip hosts
a small microprocessor between two pieces of plastic that can store and process data via an
integrated circuit (Chirico, 2014). As security features improved the magnetic strip was not
seen to be secure as it can be copied therefore magnetic chip cards are no longer seen as smart
cards as they do not meet smart card security requirements. To meet the modern definition of
a smart card, the card must:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Have a unique identifier,
Be capable of use in an automated electronic transaction,
Be used primarily as added security
Not easily forgeable or able to be copied.
Be capable to securely store data,
Be capable of running a variety of security algorithms and functions (Oxford, 2019).
A smart card is tamper resistant and can be used for highly secure storage making it

beneficial to house secret keys. A smart card implementing the proper security controls is read
only once written to and therefore cannot be copied and then misused. The ability to have a
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unique identifier, contain encryption keys, and be tamper resistant makes smart cards the ideal
option for multi-factor authentication (Hansmann, Nicklous, Schack, & Seliger, 2000).
History
Diners Club started the first credit card in the early 1950s. It was a plastic card that
had the name of the cardholder printed on the front. With possession of this little plastic card,
you could buy goods or services on credit at selected hotels or restaurants (Hansmann,
Nicklous, Schack, & Seliger, 2000). Like all good ideas the plastic card could be forged or
stolen so protection was implemented by visual features such as security printing and the
signature panel. Eventually, these rudimentary security features became inadequate and they
added a magnetic stripe on the back of the card which allowed for digital data to be stored.
This increased handling costs for merchants and banks by making machine-readable card
accessories necessary. Banks implemented the additional security feature of requiring a user
to enter a pin at its automatic teller machines (ATMs) when presenting a debit card. Over
time, it became apparent the magnetic-stripe technology had a major flaw. The data stored on
the stripe can be read, deleted and rewritten at will by anyone with access to a suitable
magnetic card reader/writer (Rankl & Effing, 2010). The idea of the smart card began with a
patent filed by two German inventors, Jurgen Dethloff and Helmut Grotrupp in 1968. During
the 1970’s CII-Honeywell-Bull demonstrated the first prototype microprocessor-based smart
card (Chirico, 2014). In 1974 Roland Moreno recorded his smart card patents that stimulated
much growth with smart card development. Moreno’s provided the semiconductor industry
with the means to provide low cost integrated circuit supplies.
OpenCard Framework
The OpenCard Framework (OCF) is a standard Java framework for working with
smart cards. The OCF is an open source framework found available on the internet at no cost.
The OCF originated from the OpenCard Consortium through work done by IBM and
Gemplus (CardContact, 2019). The architecture was created to provide a set of standards and
commonality for card operating system providers, card terminal vendors, and card issuers
(Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000).
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Java Card
The Java Card technology combines a subset of the Java programming language with
a runtime environment optimized for smart cards and similar small-memory embedded
devices. The Java Card platform is a smart card platform enabled with Java Card technology
(also called a “Java Card”). This technology allows for multiple applications to run on a
single card and provides facilities for secure interoperability of applications. Applications for
the Java Card platform are called applets (Java Card Applications) (Chirico, 2014).
The Java Card Technology is a virtual machine on a smart card or other tamperresistant security chips that utilizes the Java language. The Java Card Virtual Machine
(JCVM) is split into two parts that consists of a part that runs off-card and the other that runs
on-card. On the JCVM on-card portion is the Java Card bytecode interpreter. On the off-card
portion is the Java Card converter (Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000). The
Java Card Technology utilizes the JCVM as an operating system that allows Java Card applets
to run on a variety of smart cards. This is similar to how a Java applet runs on different
computers (Chirico, 2014). A Java Card may be contact or contactless or both. Contact means
the smart card uses a chip that houses a microprocessor while contactless means the smart
card uses embedded integrated circuits that store and process data via near field
communication (Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000).
2.6

Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
The US Federal government created a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credential

to be used to access Federally controlled facilities and information systems. A PIV credential
uses public key cryptography utilizing a public key certificate following multi-factor
authentication following something you know, something you have, and something you are.
The PIV credential is standardized to have specific information using technology w hich is
interoperable (United States Government, 2019).
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Public Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the origin of a persistent security infrastructure

whose services are implemented and delivered using public key cryptography (Adams &
Lloyd, 2003). A PKI will provide the policies, roles, software, hardware, and procedures
necessary to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. The most
important aspect of PKI is that it establishes the identity of people, devices, and services
(Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011).

Registration Authority (RA)
A registration authority (RA) is the standard name for the entity responsible for initial
authentication of an individual. The RA’s can be widely dispersed geographically to establish
and confirm the identity of an individual as part of the initialization process. The identity is
confirmed via physical presence and associated picture identification such as driver’s license
or passport. The RA is responsible for the unique association between certificate and person.
Credential Service Provider (CSP)
A credential service provider (CSP) establishes and maintains the enrollment records
and binding authenticators of a digital identity. They were formed in order to meet the
challenge of linking a digital identity to a single precise person or thing. A CSP can meet one
of three identity assurance levels (IALs) (Grassi, et al., 2017).
•
•
•

IAL1: Invalid or unverified digital identity. There does not have to be a link to a real
person or thing.
IAL2: There is some proof that the digital identity is real. The proof can be remote or
physically-present identity proofing.
IAL3: The digital identity is verified and validated by an authorized and trained CSP
representative by the physical presence of the real person or thing (Grassi, et al., 2017).
The CSP responsibilities are sometimes delegated to a RA where they would maintain

a close relationship in working together. The responsibilities of the CSP include collecting as
much evidence as possible to validate an applicant and determine authenticity, validity, and
accuracy. Identity validation consists of three primary acts: gathering suitable identity
evidence, sanctioning the evidence is genuine and authentic, and corroborating that the data

Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework

15

submitted as identity evidence is real, current and belongs to an actual object. The strength of
evidence validity criteria is as follows:

Strength
Unacceptable

Qualities of Identity Evidence
No acceptable identity evidence provided.

•
•
Weak

•
•
•

Fair

•
•

•

•

•
•
Strong

•

The issuing source of the evidence did not perform identity proofing.
The issuing process for the evidence means that it can reasonably be
assumed to have been delivered into the possession of the applicant.
The evidence contains:
At least one reference number that uniquely identifies itself or the
person to whom it relates, OR
The issued identity evidence contains a photograph or biometric
template (of any modality) of the person to whom it relates.
The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity
through an identity proofing process.
The issuing process for the evidence means that it can reasonably be
assumed to have been delivered into the possession of the person to
whom it relates.
The evidence:
o Contains at least one reference number that uniquely identifies
the person to whom it relates, OR
o Contains a photograph or biometric template (any modality) of
the person to whom it relates, OR
o Can have ownership confirmed through KBV.
Where the evidence includes digital information, that information is
protected using approved cryptographic or proprietary methods, or
both, and those methods ensure the integrity of the information and
enable the authenticity of the claimed issuing source to be confirmed.
Where the evidence includes physical security features, it requires
proprietary knowledge to be able to reproduce it.
The issued evidence is unexpired.
The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity
through written procedures designed to enable it to form a reasonable
belief that it knows the real-life identity of the person. Such procedures
are subject to recurring oversight by regulatory or publicly-accountable
institutions. For example, the Customer Identification Program
guidelines established in response to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
or the Red Flags Rule, under Section 114 of the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transaction Act of 2003
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•
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(FACT Act).
The issuing process for the evidence ensured that it was delivered into
the possession of the subject to whom it relates.
The issued evidence contains at least one reference number that
uniquely identifies the person to whom it relates.
The full name on the issued evidence must be the name that the person
was officially known by at the time of issuance. Not permitted are
pseudonyms, aliases, an initial for surname, or initials for all given
names.
The:
o Issued evidence contains a photograph or biometric template (of
any modality) of the person to whom it relates, OR
o Applicant proves possession of an AAL2 authenticator, or
equivalent, bound to an IAL2 identity, at a minimum.
Where the issued evidence includes digital information, that
information is protected using approved cryptographic or proprietary
methods, or both, and those methods ensure the integrity of the
information and enable the authenticity of the claimed issuing source
to be confirmed.
Where the issued evidence contains physical security features, it
requires proprietary knowledge and proprietary technologies to be able
to reproduce it.
The evidence is unexpired.
The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity by
following written procedures designed to enable it to have high
confidence that the source knows the real-life identity of the subject.
Such procedures are subject to recurring oversight by regulatory or
publicly accountable institutions.
The issuing source visually identified the applicant and performed
further checks to confirm the existence of that person.
The issuing process for the evidence ensured that it was delivered into
the possession of the person to whom it relates.
The evidence contains at least one reference number that uniquely
identifies the person to whom it relates.
The full name on the evidence must be the name that the person was
officially known by at the time of issuance. Not permitted are
pseudonyms, aliases, an initial for surname, or initials for all given
names.
The evidence contains a photograph of the person to whom it relates.
The evidence contains a biometric template (of any modality) of the
person to whom it relates.
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The evidence includes digital information, the information is protected
using approved cryptographic or proprietary methods, or both, and
those methods ensure the integrity of the information and enable the
authenticity of the issuing source to be confirmed.
The evidence includes physical security features that require
proprietary knowledge and proprietary technologies to be able to
reproduce it.
The evidence is unexpired.

Table 1: Strengths of Identity Evidence (Grassi, et al., 2017)
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12) mandated a common
identification standard to be adopted governing the interoperable use of identity credentials.
Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS201), Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to establish standards for identity
credentials.
Certification Authority (CA)
A certification authority (CA) is an entity that certifies an identity with a public key.
Basically, the CA is the method of generating the digital identity through providing a
certificate. Certification is a binding that occurs in the form of a signed data structure called a
public-key certificate. A CA is an authority on the process of certification. The issuing CA
digitally signs certificates ensuring integrity therefore a CA must be trusted by both the issuer
of the certificate and the owner of the certificate (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011). A CSP
must provide security management services for key generation and storage.
Validation Authority (VA)
The Validation Authority (VA) is the authentication system within PKI. It verifies the
validity of a digital certificate by following the requirements of the X.509 standard. A VA
manages the certificate revocation list (CRL) issued by the CAs and provides online
certificate status protocol (OSCP) function. Some VAs may also provide access control and
authorization services (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011).
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Certificate Revocation
A certificate may become revoked for a number of reasons. A person could change
their name like some do upon marriage. Perhaps the CA issued an improper certificate or the
private key has become compromised. Whatever the reason, when it is necessary to invalidate
a certificate it must be revoked. This is usually done with a certificate revocation list (CRL).
The VA would check the CRL as part of its process before authenticating. The issue with the
current system is that the CRL is generated and published periodically potentially allowing an
invalid certificate to be authorized when it should not (Adams & Lloyd, 2003).
PKI Architecture Overview
The authentication and authorization validation process of MFA requires strong trust
that must have meaning and be quantifiable. Since trust is more of a social construct, giving it
meaning and finding measurements within an electronic system proves challenging. PKI’s
reliability on the correct usage of a public/private key pairs depends upon there being a chain
of trust among certificate authorities (CA). A public key certificate is issued as the public
component of these key pairs and are often associated with common access cards (CACs).
These CA’s are the third-party servers providing the certification path to authentication. Path
validation and path construction are essential to the proper management of trust within PKI
(Rahoof, 2017).
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Figure 1: Service Authentication

Before allowing a user access to a system or network, the authenticity of the public
key presented must be assured. A validation authority (VA) is a trusted server providing a
means of verifying the validity of a digital certificate. The trusting entity sends a certificate to
the VA server that validates the public key certificate (PKC). This process typically occurs on
the client side and requires the use of software that can support the protocols and algorithms.
An organization’s use of a VA in addition to establishing policies provide confidence in who
is and who is not allowed on their systems (Ma, 2011).
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Figure 2: Validation Authority Schematic Diagram
Path construction is the process of building a CA certification path. Constructing this
path is generally more difficult than path validation (Rahoof, 2017). These paths are defined
and based upon the X.509 PKI standard [8]; further details can be gleamed from examination
of that standard. Path construction typically begins with a root CA that generates its own selfsigned certificate. Once the root CA is established it binds the identity and public key of an
intermediate CA. The intermediate CA launches the next CA in the path and so on and so on
until the path reaches the end-user who seeks a certificate (Ma, 2011).
2.8

Blockchain
In as much as email ushered in a new way of sending letters to businesses and people,

blockchain has provided a new way of storing transactions and other kinds of data (a
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database). Databases have been used to centrally store data for decades. Blockchain provides
a decentralized method of storing data. Data is entered into a block and then added to a chain
of blocks. This structure forms a blockchain. Each block in the chain is represented by a
cryptographic hash that contains its own hash as well as the hash for the previous block
(Gates, 2017). Blockchain is defined as “a peer-to-peer, distributed ledger that is
cryptographically-secure, append-only, immutable, and updatable only via consensus or
agreement among peers” (Bashir, 2018). The foundation of the blockchain began with a paper
published by Stefan Konst in 2000 that provided instructions for implementing
cryptographically secured chains. Blockchain offers several key benefits such as transparency,
trust, cost reduction, transaction improvements, and security (Gates, 2017).
Blockchain became popular due to the fact that it was the technology behind Bitcoin.
Bitcoins are a type of electronic cash used as a digital currency on the internet. Bitcoin spelled
with an uppercase ‘B’ references the cryptocurrency payment network, protocols, and
blockchain. When spelled with a lowercase ‘b’, bitcoin refers to the units of bitcoin. For
example, Sally is sending Bob 1.5 bitcoins (Ethereum, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and
Cryptocurrencies Resources, 2018). In order to explain how blockchains function bitcoins will
be used.
Creating a blockchain
A block is an assortment of transactions which are arranged logically. A transaction is
the transference of digital currency from a sender’s account to a receiver’s account. A block
can consist of more than one transaction (Bashir, 2018). Block 0, or the genesis block, is the
first block on the blockchain. The genesis block within Bitcoin was hardcoded at the time of
creation with the message “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for
banks.” Each block contains a hash of the previous block’s message hash linking each block
together in a chain and providing additional security that the previous block’s transaction has
not been tampered with. The Bitcoin blockchain uses the SHA-256 algorithm as it’s hash. The
SHA-256 algorithm generates a unique, fixed-size 256-bit hash (Gates, 2017).
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Block 0
Hash of previous block: 0 –
no previous block
Hash of Block 0:
0000641727781545e50c
0235823c9ae0785d4194
99cc5a5dcdff2332a53f0f7

Block 1
Hash of previous block:
0000641727781545e50c
0235823c9ae0785d4194
99cc5a5dcdff2332a53f0f7

Hash of Block 1:
0000ed29ee4097b79e194
adb355b18c500a900ffb3a
Transactions and other data 1670dec4673eac2abdd0

Transactions and other data

Block N-1
Hash of previous block:
00002365ed54fa1452874
12541b215654554g5114
d5225529874ad214525

Block N

Hash of previous block:
0000982d5f6241357ab65
Hash of Block N-1:
e52c698412d226841123
0000982d5f6241357ab65 b5658a45e5256585222
e52c698412d226841123
b5658a45e5256585222
Hash of Block N:

Transactions and other data

0000a7843de632145654
1214dc2541a215145458
47e852156333251455bc

Transactions and other data

Figure 3: The Generic Structure of a blockchain
Centralization vs Decentralization vs Distributed
Centralization is the concentration of control of an action or process under a single
authority. Basically, this means that a data transaction must be verified by a trusted third
party. For example, when shopper uses a credit card for a purchase, the store is trusting
payment for the goods provided in another party other than the shopper. This centralization of
credit gives financial institutions prominent authority because these institutions as trusted
third parties become the final decision makers on a shopper’s creditworthiness. It is extremely
challenging to correct inaccuracies of information stored in a centralized database (D. Richard
Kuhn, 2001).
Decentralization is a fundamental aspect of blockchain technology. The trusted third
party relied upon in a centralized system such as PKI is unnecessary. Instead, blockchain
utilizes a consensus mechanism to validate transactions (Bashir, 2018). Every participant in
the system makes its own decisions. Due to the viewability and validation by anyone,
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blockchain provides transparency and trust. It allows a system of trust between parties without
requiring an intermediary. Negotiations can be performed between individuals for practically
anything; property, money, digital files, etc. (Gates, 2017). The responsibility and control of
the correctness of the data stored in a blockchain-based system falls upon the individuals
involved in the transactions. This means the network must agree and decide. Within Bitcoin,
changes must be agreed to by a certain majority of the network. This may be 50% but could
be as high as 70 to 80% of the network. There is a risk of a 51% attack on a blockchain
network if a malicious user(s) controls more than 50% of the computers on the network.
There is potential for collaboration among users on a blockchain network to influence current
or future development through a 51% attack (Bashir, 2018).
A distributed system is where all of the parties work together as a single coherent
system. It has qualities of centralization and decentralization. There is still a central authority
that has some control over the other parties in governing processes yet the other parties can
make many of their own decisions and work autonomously. Distribution improves
availability, reliability, fault tolerance, performance, and scalability (Bashir, 2018).

Figure 4: Graphical Representation of Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed
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Public Blockchains
A public blockchain is available to anyone who wants to participate in the blockchain.
There is no one exclusive power over the blockchain. Everything is open to all of those using
the blockchain (White, 2018).
Private Blockchains
A private blockchain has an organization or consortium who controls the permission
to write data onto the blockchain. There are a set of rules that govern the blockchain.
Transactions are not allowed if they violate the rules and regulations (White, 2018).
Permissioned Blockchains
A permissioned blockchain only allows those authorized to have a role within the
blockchain. They are the middle ground between public and private blockchains. The
verification is performed by predetermined nodes. They use cryptography to give permissions
to those using the blockchain (White, 2018).
2.9

Blockchain-based PKI
The PKI framework as it currently exists has vulnerabilities. Reporting unauthorized

certificates is a time consuming and labor-intensive effort that leaves a CA open to a man-inthe-middle (MITM) attack. If the CA’s are not operating correctly, the introduction of
encryption has no value. Blockchain-based PKI techniques provides methods to secure the
CA vulnerabilities immediately in real time (Matsumoto S. &., 2017). Blockchain is a data
structure that utilizes public-key cryptography in the creation of tamper-proof digital
signatures that may be shared among parties. Basically, they are online ledgers that provide
decentralized and transparent data sharing (Kshetri). Blockchains are the technology behind
bitcoins that have been successfully used in E-commerce. Blockchains rely on cryptographic
proof instead of trust negating the use of a trusted third-party and allowing anonymity in
online transactions (Yakubov).
In order to affectively implement blockchain within two-factor authentication,
establishing trust would be necessary to instantiate security measures against interference,
breach, and eavesdropping (Robey, 2017). A considerable vulnerability to PKI applications
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and platforms is their dependence on a centralized cloud. The PKI in its current form is
centralized relying on trusted third-parties. Decentralizing and incorporating blockchains
provides the means of overcoming several of the problems linked with the centralized cloud
approach. Provenance and other startups are using blockchain to promote trust in product
transactions from source to the customer (Kshetri). Blockchains can cryptographically sign
transactions and verify the originator’s cryptographic signature to guarantee a message’s
origin (Kshetri). Blockchains also provide secure traceability of certifications and other
relevant data in supply chains. Blockchain’s public availability ensures transactions can be
linked to identify vulnerable mobile devices (Robey, 2017). Suitable for registering time,
location, price, parties, and data as they move through the supply chain, blockchain based
MFA systems will help strengthen mobile device security (Kshetri).

Figure 5: PKI Trust Structure Path Construction
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2.10 RFID
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a low powered system that
transmits wirelessly. The tags are generally passive devices meaning they have no power
source while the readers are a more complicated computing device with sufficient power,
memory, communication interfaces, and its own clock. RFID began as a way to replace
barcodes but blossomed to include a wide variety of applications such as toll transponders,
passports, credit cards, access badges, pet tracking devices, pharmaceuticals, clothes, library
books, and much more (Gritzalis). This has led to RFID becoming the preferred method of
providing wireless communication between IoT devices. This has increased the need to
commission a secure method of authentication that involves MFA. Electronic Product Code
Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 G2) standard is the most widespread RFID standard projected
to provide secure authentication for RFID users (Kshetri).
Lightweight authentication protocols incorporating simple cryptographic functions
have been developed to provide an authentication method (Ma, 2011). RFID systems
incorporate RFID tags and RFID readers. To utilize a PKI MFA, each tag needs its own
public/private key pair with a public key certificate. The primary purpose of RFID tags is to
allow identification by readers. A reader that has become the possession of a malicious user
(i.e. stolen, lost, compromised) can be used to identify and track tags. Therefore, it is more
critical to have trust in the reader than the tag (Gritzalis). One possible way of providing trust
despite the risks associated with the reader is via near field communication.
2.11 NFC
Near field communication (NFC) is a more simplistic implementation of the RFID
technology. NFC involves two wireless devices operating via short range frequencies within
5-10 cm. There are two modes: active and passive. An active mode device starts the
communication. These devices are referred to as the initiator. The initiator generates its own
power and sends information by amplitude shift keying. Within passive mode the device is
referred to as the target and uses the radio frequency (RF) field from the initiator as power for
its communication (Matsumoto S. R.). Within NFC, the lines between reader and tag are
blurred eliminating the primary issues of RFID PKI usage. For example, NFC-enabled
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smartphones can switch between being a reader and being a tag. While sending the
smartphone acts as the tag and while receiving it acts as the reader.
Gemalto
Gemalto has been making contact smart cards for the DoD and other agencies for
years. Gemalto uses the java card for their smart cards. Java card is an industry standard
technology platform developed by Sun Microsystems (now Oracle) to enable Java-based
applications that run on smart cards. These Java-based applications are called applets. Java
card helps developers build, test and deploy smart card-based applications quickly and
efficiently with an object-oriented programming model and off the shelf development tools.
Since Java Card 3.0, the card has been extended to support a Web application model with
servlets running on the card, and TCP/IP as basic protocol. The Virtual machine and Runtime
Environment have been upgraded as well to support multithreading and hierarchical class
loaders. The Java Card platform can run on contact and contactless devices since it runs on
secure elements that power the Card Emulation mode in NFC. The java card operating system
they use is called JLEP. This information was obtained from email and phone conversations
with Gemalto employees. It was challenging to get more information. Gemalto clammed up
when it was discovered I was a dissertation student with no budget to buy anything from
them. They ghosted my emails and phones calls after revealing my student status.
NXP Semiconductors
NXP Semiconductors makes a smart card using Java Card Open Platform (JCOP)
operating system. The JCOP operating system has a Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) and
lots of information can be found on it compared to JLEP. NXP’s smart cards are more popular
in Europe than the United States. The most popular smart card using NXP’s JCOP is MiFare
(NXP, 2019).
Google Titan
Using special firmware created by Google, Titan is a security key that provides a 2FA
solution for logging into accounts on desktop and mobile devices. They have a variety of keys
built on FIDO open standards so they can be used with many apps and services. Titan has the
ability to operate via NFC, USB, and Bluetooth (Google, 2019).
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Yubico
Yubico has incorporated NFC into their YubiKey and given it smartcard capabilities.
They perform RSA or ECC signing and decryption via the private key stored on the Yubikey
following PKCS#11 standards. They come in a variety of styles and work with both Android
and Apple smartphones.

Figure 6: Yubico’s YubiKey with NFC
Just tap the YubiKey to the back of a NFC enabled smartphone and the phone acts as
the PIV smartcard reader. The Yubikey is being used for authentication for mobile devices,
apps, and websites. This provides better security than a one-time passcode and is much more
convenient as well.
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Figure 7: YubiKey Touch and Go Capabilities with Mobile App
PKI utilizing NFC
A cryptographic challenge response protocol based on PKC and PKI has been
developed for protecting NFC tags from attacks. This proposed framework consists of using
symmetric cryptography (Matsumoto S. &., 2017).
To enhance security, a secure protocol is presented with the NFC chip. The intent is to
add an extra layer of security within NFC-enabled systems by incorporating a
data/information processing unit. The security protocol includes a processing stack. This stack
consists of handshaking, scheme, certificate verification, signature verification, and an alert
mechanism.
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Figure 8: A typical NFC architecture
The process begins by the handshaking scheme asking for a certificate. If the
certificate and the signature match, data is stored for further processing. If at any time there is
an error i.e. the certificate and the signature cannot be verified, the data is discarded from the
system and alert messages are transmitted.

Figure 9: The proposed NFC system
The proposed NFC system was tested and found to adequately protect against tag
manipulation and data insertion. There are minor increases to the processing time the larger
the signature size used. Thus, to save processing time use a smaller signature (Matsumoto S.
&., 2017). Robust authentication is a requirement for MFA. Most leading services provide
strong authentication through symmetric cryptography such as Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) or asymmetric cryptography such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Asymmetric
solutions such as ECC are complex to implement and often inefficient. Researchers have
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discovered a secure NFC with a flexible architecture call Cryptographic Protected Tags
(CRYPTA). The latter works passively using a low-area design that utilizes as few resources
as possible. This passive implementation provides a secure NFC/RFID that may be used in
NFC-enabled smart phones (Plos). Authenticity and confidentiality are used to provide endto-end communication between a client and a server; therefore, a server is required to
authenticate its identity to a client and vice-versa (Matsumoto S. R.). The CRYPTA tag
provides strength in authentication through an analog antenna that demodulates and modulates
the data, extracts the power supply, and provides a stable clock and reset signal (Plos). The
framing logic is the portion that handles the time critical low-level commands. The
cryptographic operations are processed within the crypto unit and is accessed by the
microcontroller via micro-code patterns. The tag’s power is supplied from the RF field and
provides the interface for the data, clock, and reset. Smart cards often use 32-b controllers that
have high area and power consumption, CRYPTA uses an 8-b microcontroller with a low chip
area and low power consumption making CRPTA more efficient than anything currently in
use (Plos). The only downside to CRYPTA is that it is a proposed real-world RFID system
that includes all hardware components needed for a practical chip fabrication. While the
scientists who designed the system invented a prototype that tested well in the lab (Plos),
more testing will be needed to prove the viability of it as an IoT solution.
2.12 Zero Trust Architecture
A Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) provides no implicit trust to a system based on their
physical or network location. Access to data resources is only allowed when the resource is
required, and authentication to both users and devices is performed before the connection is
established. The ZTA is a response to enterprise network trends that include remote users and
cloud-based assets that are not located within an enterprise-owned network boundary. The
ZTA focuses on protecting resources, not network sectors, as network location is no longer
seen as the prime component to the security stance of the resource.
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CHAPTER 3
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
This chapter provides a formal characterization of the Identity, Credential, and Access
Management (ICAM) Framework, describes each component of the framework and the
detailed steps in its construction. A framework for identity cannot be formed without a solid
understanding of identity within IoT. NIST Special Publication 800-63-3 Digital Identity
Guidelines were followed. NIST Publications were followed and attributed as necessary in
describing the framework. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, industry and government want to
know who is on their networks and what they are doing while on them. The PKI systems that
worked so well in the 20th century do not meet the mobile demands of the 21st century. In
today’s dynamic world, PKI must become decentralized and identity must be digitized in such
a manner that an individual feel assured they have control over their personal data. As identity
and security were an afterthought of the internet, safely maneuvering cyberspace relies on
frameworks that will provide the needed infrastructure to protect individuals, industries, and
government’s data. The ICAM Framework although theoretical provides updates to PKI that
establishes a digital identity for our mobile world that no other framework has given.
3.1

RESEARCH APPROACH
This study utilized the design science research (DSR) method to develop the ICAM

theoretical framework. The DSR method is a creative research paradigm that concentrates on
the development and performance of artifacts with the explicit intention of improving the
functional performance of the artifact. Compared to other research methodologies, DSR is
more pragmatic and is a quest for understanding and improvement. The DSR method uses
design as a research method or technique targeting the improvement or innovation of
information and communication technology (ICT) artifacts (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015).
Design science research is the design and investigation of artifacts that are goaloriented. The technical research goal defines the problems and designs an artifact so that it
contributes to solving these problems. The engineering cycle is the design problem solving
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process that consists of tasks: problem investigation, treatment design, treatment validation,
treatment implementation, and implementation evaluation. (Wieringa, 2014).

Figure 10: DSR Engineering Cycle (Wieringa, 2014)
Due to the problem-solving or performance improving aspects of DSR, it is sometimes
called improvement research. Emphasis is placed on contributing to the body of knowledge
surrounding the problem set with the goal of providing potential solutions to the areas of
greatest concern (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015). Therefore, this research is focused on the
development of an artifact that facilitates solutions of critical interest within the research
community or society or both in regards to having a trusted digital identity that will work in
our mobile world.
Treatment
The DSR method sidesteps calling an artifact a solution in order to prevent
impartiality to an artifacts result. Instead artifacts are considered treatments. Treatment
suggests that the artifact is interacting with a problem and allows the researcher to gage the
effectiveness is “treating” the problem. Treatments are designed and documented in a
specification. A design is a decision about what to do and a specification is a documentation
of that decision (Wieringa, 2014).
Implementation
An implementation can mean different things to different people depending upon
context. For the purposes of this research, an implementation takes the standard DSR
definition and defines implementation as the application of the treatment to the original
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problem set. Implementation begins to appear after the first few iterations of the engineering
cycle. The treatment is designed then evaluated returning to the design phase as often as
necessary until the evaluation and validation phases show satisfactory results (Wieringa,
2014).

Validation and Evaluation
Treatment validation requires that it contribute to the technical research goals if
implemented. As shown in Figure 6: DSR Engineering Cycle (Wieringa, 2014) validation
comes before implementation and involves a thorough examination of the effects of the
treatment upon the problem set. Based on the validation process a design theory is developed
which envisions the outcome if the treatment were implemented (Wieringa, 2014).
Evaluation is a constant progression throughout the engineering cycle that consist of
multiple micro-evaluations at every design aspect choice. Evaluation is performed after
implementation. Implementation within DSR does not consist of using it in the real world.
The goal of evaluation is to investigate how effective a treatment is through simulation,
modeling, or theorizing (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015). The ICAM framework was created
through theorizing from simulations to create an artifact that can used for future work.
3.2

LIMITATIONS
The ICAM Framework will decentralize the existing centralized PKI system. Within

the context of this research, the validation and evaluation of the decentralization occurred in
limited locations. The framework is theoretically designed to successfully function in an
unlimited number of sites. Due to the robust nature and substantiation of decentralization
within blockchain technology in real world implementations, the limitation in number should
not be a problem. Consideration to validating and evaluating the framework in larger numbers
is mentioned in future work.
3.3

THE ICAM COMPONENTS
The ICAM system can be broken down into three major components: the frontend

subsystem, the issuance and management subsystem, and the access control subsystem. The
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frontend contains the PIV card, the card reader, and the PIN input device. The Issuance and
management subsystem comprise the components responsible for the identity proofing and
registrations, the card and key issuance and management, and PKI directory and certificate
status servers. The access control subsystem consists of the logical and physical access
control systems, the protected data, and the authorization data.

Access Control

Issuance & Management

PKI Directory
Data &
Certificate Status
Responder

Credential Service Provider (CSP)
Identity
Management

Card Issuance
&
Maintenance

Data
Authorization Data

Logical Access Control (VA)
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Direction of Information Flow

Data

Components
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Figure 11: ICAM PIV System Overview
3.4

ISSUANCE AND MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM
The issuance and management subsystem can be broken down into two major

components; identity management and credential management. Identity management allows
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an organization to establish, maintain, and terminate identities. Credential management allows
an organization to issue, track, update, and revoke digital credentials for identities.
Identity Management
The foundation of any system managing identity is trust in the authenticity of that
identity. In the United States (U.S.), when a citizen is born, the parents provide the hospital
with a name. The hospital issues a notarized birth certificate with the person’s name, date of
birth, and U.S. citizenship. That person now has an identity for life. Any time the person
wants to prove who they are, they simply provide their birth certificate. With a birth
certificate, a U.S. citizen can obtain a U.S. passport as it is unlawful to enter or exit the United
States without one. The U.S. citizen also resides in a state or U.S. territory that will issue a
state identification (ID) that most citizens obtain in the form of a driver’s license. Citizens,
government agencies, and industry trust birth certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses as
identification for an individual. Since digital identities require the same level of trust,
identities within ICAM begin with a credential service provider that vets the person’s identity
through the showing of a birth certificate, passport, or driver’s license/ state ID.
3.4.1.1 Identity Proofing
Identity proofing is the process by which an identity is first established. This process
can be simple or complicated depending on the IAL that is required of the identity. The ICAM
Framework strongly encourages IAL 3 for proofing the identity of the person or object. This
means the digital identity is verified and validated by an authorized and trained credential
service provider by the physical presence of the real person or thing.
3.4.1.2 Creation
Establishing a digital identity record within the system composed of attributes that
define a person or entity. Each identity must be associated with an identifier. An identifier is a
unique attribute that can be used to locate a specific identity. For example, a state may have
more than one Susan Jones but the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) provides each with
a different driver’s license number.
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3.4.1.3 Maintenance
Once a record of the identity is stored within the system it must be maintained.
Identity lifecycle management needs to occur ensuring accurate and current attributes within
an identity record over its life cycle. For example, current home address and phone number is
in the system if the person moves, etc.
3.4.1.4 Identity Resolution
If for whatever reason, there is more than one identity record for the same person or
entity, the identity must be reconciled. There must be only one identifier per person or entity
for the system to maintain its credibility and trustability. Extreme care must be taken to ensure
that no loopholes exist in the identity proofing to allow a malicious user that ability to create a
second or third identity record.
3.4.1.5 Deactivation
Identity record deactivation is critical for similar reasons as identity resolution. When
a person or entity should no longer have access to the infrastructure for whatever reason, their
identity record must be deactivated immediately. This maintains confidence and assurance
that an identity can be trusted.
Credential Management
Just like there must be a trusted agency and system to manage identities, there must be
a trusted agency and system to manage credentials, a CSP. The CSP will issue, track, update,
and revoke credentials for an entity within an organization. Following HSPD-12, the PIV
credential is the one ICAM Framework uses as digital proof of an entity’s identity. The CSP
will function at IAL3. With the ICAM Framework following the criteria for superior identity
evidence, individuals, government, and industry can be assured that an identity is authentic
and has not been forged. They can feel confident that any information they have been
provided is correct and pertains to the real-life object. When a CSP is IAL3 and meets
superior strength for identity evidence the goal of establishing a connection between a
claimed identity and a real-life object is confirmed through following the highest levels of
identity verification. There are 5 phases of credential management, sponsorship, registration,
issuance, maintenance, and revocation.
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3.4.2.1 Sponsorship
Before an entity is provided a digital certificate that allows access to a network or
system, the entity must be sponsored. Via an authorized role through a registered entity
following the principle of least privilege, an entity is granted permission for admittance to
only the devices or applications in which there is a strong validated reason to access. This
authorization should be granted via documentation that is stored at registration in case the
need should ever arise to confirm or investigate the reasons access was granted. The
authorization will include the identity of the entity, the systems, devices, and application the
entity is allowed to access, and the duration this permission is allowed. Every sponsorship is
allowed a maximum of two years. This is to ensure a continuous monitoring of all entities
permissions in order to evaluate the risks to internal assets and business functions in order to
provide better security.
3.4.2.2 Registration
A typical registration would consist of the entities name, address, sponsorship, and
identity validation. If the entity is a non-person such as a system, application, or mobile
device then the address would consist of the entities mac address instead of a physical
address. The identity of the entities must be confirmed through an organization following the
identity management of the ICAM Framework. The sponsorship is a first check on a valid
entity but the entities identity should be confirmed again at registration as a defense in depth
process to ensure the truth of identities allowed to register.
3.4.2.3 Issuance aka the Certification Authority (CA)
Issuance of a digital identity is done through the CA. Once identity has been
confirmed real and has sponsorship, a digital identity is issued on a PIV card. The PIV card is
a contact/contactless java card that follows the FIPS201 standards. This digital identity is a
signed certificate. The CA will issue a signed certificate following the X.509 standard that
certifies an entity’s ownership of a public key. This public key will be added to the
blockchain. The private key remains in the entity’s possession securely stored on the PIV
card.
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The ICAM PIV X.509 Certificate structure follows NIST and X.509 standards because
it works therefore no point in reinventing the wheel. The only difference is the addition of the
Blockchain name and blockchain public key.

Version
Serial number
Algorithm ID
Issuer
Validity
--Not Before Date
-- Not After Date
Subject
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm
Subject Public Key
Issuer Unique Identifier
Subject Unique Identifier
Extensions
Blockchain Unique Identifier
Blockchain Public Key
Certificate Signature Algorithm
Certificate Signature

Table 2: Structure of ICAM PIV X.509 Certificate
An example of an ICAM X.509 certificate:
Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
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Issuer: C=BE, ST=East Flanders, L=Ghent, O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent,
O=Computer Science Department, OU=MSEC, CN=MSEC Tutorial Client CA
Validity
Not Before: May 12 13:38:13 2014 GMT
Not After : May 12 13:38:13 2015 GMT
Subject: C=BE, ST=East Flanders, L=Ghent, O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent,
O=Computer Science Department, OU=MSEC, CN=Alice in Wonderland
/emailAddress=alice@msec.be
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
00:be:2e:3d:32:72:4a:92:ff:67:7b:df:7c:89:83:
...
72:91
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
5D:1D:32:41:95:72:C6:CA:9C:E6:91:4B:32:50:C7:6E:14:68:F9:CA
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:8B:D5:5E:F2:84:62:04:E4:91:25:78:74:87:14:5F:F2:F0:20:AC:2E
DirName:/CN=MSEC Tutorial Root CA/OU=MSEC/O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent/
O=Computer Science Department/L=Ghent/ST=East Flanders/C=BE
serial:02
X509v3 Key Usage:
Digital Signature, Non-Repudiation, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
3e:be:89:73:ed:92:ff:f2:89:2b:98:0a:46:e8:26:b7:af:53:
...
a7:4a:ec:89

There are three certificates on the PIV card; encryption certificate, signature
certificate, and PIV-auth certificate. The PIV-Auth will be used for authentication, Signature
will be used for email and document signing, and encryption will be used for encryption
(obviously).
Identity Management Framework PIV Card Certificate Configuration
PIV Authentication

Signature

Encryption

Table 3: ICAM PIV Card Certificate Configuration
3.4.2.3.1 Blockchain
The CA issuing the certificates is also responsible for the blockchain. Since trust in the
identity is the primary aim of the ICAM Framework, a private blockchain is instantiated. Only
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vetted agencies such as the CAs through the CSPs may make changes to the blockchain. A
vetted agency is one that can be trusted by confirmation through a certificate issued to them
from the root CA.
CA
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Figure 12: The root certificate authority is centralized
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There are two blockchains, an active blockchain and a revoked blockchain. The active
blockchain contains the list of entities, their access privileges, and their public keys that are
allowed onto the network/system. The revoked blockchain contains a list of entities and their
certificates public keys that are no longer allowed onto the network/system. Every ten minutes
if a change to the directory has occurred, the CA adds a new block and chains it to the
previous block. This heavily encrypted new block contains a ledger of all of the public keys of
authorized entities and their permissions. This block is signed with the CAs private key. Since
the blockchain is private and the CA is a trusted entity within the system, no mining is
necessary. The new block is sent across the network to allow all nodes to sync.
3.4.2.4 Maintenance
Maintaining the blockchains of digital certificates is the most critical area to ensure
success of the ICAM framework. Certificates expire, get revoked, or people lose them. All of
this requires care and attention to the process. Maintenance is comprised of 5 key subsets:
renewal, reset, suspension, blocking, and reissuance. Naturally, the blockchain kept as is with
new blocks added every ten minutes would grow larger than the system could efficiently
handle. Therefore, the root CA will monitor system productivity and make structural changes
to the blockchains as needed. As there is only one root CA this maintains the integrity of the
blockchains and system efficiency.
3.4.2.4.1 Renewal
When a certificate expires the entity must go through the same process that they did
initially in order to obtain new credentials. In order for the entity not to lose access to the
systems and services they need, the renewal process should be started before the certificate
expires. All expired certificates will be kept linked to the entity for accurately identifying the
entities history. Since history is not a primary feature of the system, records of old certificates
will be kept in a traditional database that can be accessed as needed by the system. Renewing
a certificate must insure no duplicate digital identities therefore the reset step follows renewal.
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3.4.2.4.2 Reset
The reset process is similar to identity resolution in the Identity Management system.
There must be only one active certificate per entity for the system to maintain its credibility
and trustability. The reset process consists of changing the old certificate to the new certificate
throughout the system. A thorough check and recheck will be performed to ensure the system
functions with the new certificate being the only certificate tied to the entity.
3.4.2.4.3 Suspension
There are times when an entities certificates will need to be suspended. This means
that the entity cannot continue to use the certificate for a period of time. The suspension time
period must be specified with a start and end date. If the suspension is not resumed before the
end date, the certificate is revoked.
3.4.2.4.4 Blocking
The ICAM Framework is intended to provide trust in the identity of entities using a
system. Since no system is perfect, instances may occur when a digital credential must be
blocked. This means that the entity may not access some or all of the network, applications,
and systems. An update to the blockchain occurs instantly. There is no waiting the usual 10
minutes to ensure the strictest security possible to the system.
3.4.2.4.5 Reissuance
Reissuance is very similar to renewal but occurs before the expiration of an existing
certificate. This could occur if the entity’s PIV Card is lost or stolen. If the PIV has been
stolen, reissuance and blocking should occur. Reissuance follows all steps from the renewal
process.
3.4.2.5 Revocation
If an entity loses their privileges to the system, their certificates can no longer be used.
The reason for the revocation is documented and digitally signed by an authorized entity. The
revoked blockchain is updated.
3.5

ACCESS CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
The access control subsystem provides access management which allows only those

entities permitted the ability to perform an action on a particular resource. The access control
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subsystem is where the verification authority (VA) is housed. The three most common access
management services are policy administration, authentication, and authorization.
Verification Authority (VA)
Before access is granted to any system the VA is the system that will confirm the
validity of the certificates by checking against the active blockchain and the revoked
blockchain. The VA is a node on the network of those receiving the blockchains. It makes no
changes to the blockchains. It only reads them. All this system does is compare the certificates
from an incoming request to the blockchains. Having the blockchains sent to the VA as part of
the blockchain peer-to-peer network reduces the amount of network traffic required for
certificate validation. The lists are there at the system where access is being requested.
Policy Administration
The ICAM Framework does not establish specific policy administration. This is left up
to the system owners who are using the ICAM Framework as only they know the laws,
regulations, rules, and organizational access policies to put into effect for their system. Policy
administration is mentioned within the ICAM Framework to ensure that access policies are
established for the system. The rules and regulations for organizational access policies should
be clearly defined and documented. Credential management will follow policy administration
guidelines.
Authentication
The VA will check that the credential presented via a PIV card was issued by a trusted
organization, the credential’s expiration date, and if the credential is on the revoked
blockchain. When the entities identity is confirmed through the VA using its credential to be
valid, the entity will confirm that the credential belongs to them by entering their PIN. When
both the certificate and PIN are confirmed (two-factor authentication), the entities identity is
considered authenticated.
Authorization
Just because an entity has been confirmed authentic does not mean that entity has
access to the system. Once authenticated, the entities authorizations listed on the active
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blockchain are checked. If the system the entity requested access to is on the list,
authorization is granted. If the system is not on the list, the entity is denied authorization.
Access Management
Policy administration determines the rule sets that govern access to resources. The
linking and unlinking of access permissions for the entity to a resource must be followed. For
example, policy sets the length of time before the entity needs to reauthenticate themselves.
This could be a prompting to reenter the PIN assuring the entity is the genuine. Or locking the
entity out of the resource and reinitiating the request for access.
3.6

FRONTEND SUBSYSTEM
The frontend subsystem consists of the PIV card, the PIV reader, and the PIN input

device. The user will present their PIV card to the PIV reader and be prompted by the PIN
input device to enter their PIN. The PIV reader and the PIN input device communicates with
the access control subsystem to establish authentication and authorization.
PIV Card
The PIV card will be a contact/contactless Java Card that follows NIST Special
Publication 800-73. The PIV card will contain a cardholder unique identifier (CHUID) that is
digitally signed by the authorizing CA and the card authentication. The card authentication is
a certificate containing the key pair that is used to verify that the PIV credential was issued by
an authorized entity, has not expired, and has not been revoked.
The following two electronic elements authenticate the identity of the PIV card owner.
The PIV card will contain a photograph that is digitally signed allowing confirmation that the
printed photo on the card has not been altered and PIV authentication. The PIV authentication
is a certificate and key pair that is used to verify that the PIV credential was issued by an
authorized entity, has not expired, has not been revoked, and the holder of the credential is the
same individual it was issued to.
The following electronic elements are for usage by the PIV card holder. A digital
signature which is a certificate and key pair that allows the PIV card owner to digitally sign a
document or email, providing both integrity and non-repudiation. Encryption which is a
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certificate and key pair allowing the PIV card owner to digitally encrypt documents or email
thus providing confidentiality through ensuring only authorized parties can read the document
or email.
The PIV card contact and contactless portions will mimic each other by each
containing all of the information listed above. The contact (chip) portion of the Java Card is to
allow functionality with existing PKI readers on desktops and laptops while the contactless
(NFC) portion of the Java Card provides the means to expand PKI to mobile devices.
PIV Reader
The PIV card reader is the piece of hardware that helps read the card. The card reader
supplies power to the chip or NFC and allows the device’s operating system to talk to the PIV
credential chip or NFC operating system. Most smart mobile devices are equipped with the
ability to read NFC (contactless portion of the PIV card). Existing PKI systems can continue
to operate as they always have by using their current contact PIV card readers.
PIN Input Device
Middleware is the computer software or drivers that allow the computer (whether
desktop or mobile) to interact with the PIV credentials to support authentication, digital
signatures, encryption, and integrations with the personal identification number (PIN) device.
On a standard desktop or laptop, the PIN input device will be a keyboard. On a mobile device,
this could be a software tool that is part of the middleware or a separate piece of software that
works in conjunction with the middleware. If the mobile device is a smartphone, the PIN
input device could be the phone’s keyboard, on-screen or physical.
3.7

Digital Identity Summary
The next iteration of DoD PIV cards from Gemalto will contain NFC capabilities. But

since the DoD PKI system does not have a method to handle mobile devices, the NFC portion
within the DoD PIV cards will not be utilized until a mobile PKI system is setup. The ICAM
Framework provides that solution. YubiKey has already demonstrated how NFC can securely
handle PIV credentials. NFC can securely contain the necessary credentials for digital
identity. Therefore, the ICAM will require the use of Java Cards that are contact/contactless.
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Having dual functionality will allow existing PKI systems to continue to operate as they have
while providing the additional capabilities of mobile devices.
3.8

ZTA
The new Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) reshapes traditional network defense by

moving network defenses from wide network perimeters to narrowly focusing on individual
or small groups of resources. The ICAM Framework ensures the user is who they say they are
using ZTA for trusting no one. The system will believe the person is who they say they are
only once proven. Policy administration should ensure the tenants of ZTA are being followed
by its governance.
3.9

Blockchain-based Digital Credentials
Within blockchain-based digital credentials is a certification path that leads back to the

root CA called the chain of trust. The root CA is where the chain of trust begins. Every CA
must be trusted within the ICAM Framework or the chain of trust becomes broken. The root
certificate is self-signed but every other certificate issued is signed by a CA. The CA’s
certificates are signed by the root CA.
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Block 0
Root Certificate
Hash of previous block: 0 –
no previous block

Block 1
CA Certificate

Hash of previous block:
Hash of Block 0:
0000641727781545e50c
0000641727781545e50c
0235823c9ae0785d4194
0235823c9ae0785d4194
99cc5a5dcdff2332a53f0f7
99cc5a5dcdff2332a53f0f7
Root CA’s Name
Root CA’s Public Key
Root CA’s name
Root CA’s signature

Hash of Block 1:
0000ed29ee4097b79e194
adb355b18c500a900ffb3a
1670dec4673eac2abdd0
CA’s Name
CA’s Public Key
Root CA Name
Root CA Signature

Block N-1
Hash of previous block:
00002365ed54fa1452874
12541b215654554g5114
d5225529874ad214525

Block N

Hash of previous block:
0000982d5f6241357ab65
Hash of Block N-1:
e52c698412d226841123
0000982d5f6241357ab65 b5658a45e5256585222
e52c698412d226841123
b5658a45e5256585222
Hash of Block N:
Owner’s Name
Public Key
Issuing CA’s Name
Issuing CA’s Signature

0000a7843de632145654
1214dc2541a215145458
47e852156333251455bc
Owner’s Name
Public Key
Issuing CA’s Name
Issuing CA’s Signature

Figure 14: Chain of Trust

What is being decentralized (distributed)?
What systems within PKI is being decentralized for the ICAM Framework? The root
CA is centralized but the rest are distributed. There are many CAs that can be spread out
among a country or the world. Each CA is a node on the peer-to-peer network. Only the CAs
are allowed to make changes to the blockchains. The VAs are distributed as well. There are
many VAs spread out among the resources requiring access control. The CAs and VAs do not
have to reside together but in some instances they could.
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CHAPTER 4
4 CASE STUDY (RESULTS AND DISCUSSION)
In developing a proof of concept that would answer the research questions it was
necessary to create two proof of concepts; a digital identity on NFC and a digital identity on
blockchain-based PKI. This allowed the research to focus on the questions and reveal emerging
knowledge that contributed to the ICAM framework through each iteration of the DSR
methodology. It also allowed for the two proof of concepts to provide one artifact that becomes
the object of study.
The most challenging part in developing the ICAM Framework was in figuring out a
way to allow blockchain to revoke certificates. There was research and exploration in having a
single blockchain that would contain everything. In the end, it was found that one blockchain
that had valid and invalid certificates is harder to implement and has the potential for a revoked
certificate to be missed. Therefore, two separate blockchains would be better; an active
blockchain and a revoked blockchain. All certificates will be checked to ensure they are not on
the revoked blockchain in much the same way as the certificate revocation list (CRL) works on
the standard PKI system.
4.1

Digital Identities on NFC
Yubico’s Yubikey 5 NFC was used to demonstrate this proof of concept. The Security

Key NFC from Yubico uses NFC for tap-and-go authentication over the FIDO U2F and
FIDO2/WebAuthn protocols on Android phones. While FIDO2 is not the same as PKI, it
demonstrates that NFC can be used contain a digital identity for authenticating users on their
mobile devices.
FIDO uses public key cryptography which is issued to a user upon registration but the
registration is self-sovereign. An individual saying who they are will not be a trusted digital
identity. The digital identity can be linked to a single, unique identity and validated as genuine
but the Yubikey demonstrates that public key cryptography will fit on an NFC card, can be read
by a smartphone, and has no noticeable drain on the battery life. The Yubico FIPS series
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demonstrates that FIPS 140-2 validation can be integrated at some point with NFC capabilities
to provide the highest authenticator assurance level 3 per NIST SP800-63B guidance.

Figure 15: YubiKey Touch-and-Go
Question Results
Digital Identity
•

Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the
digital identity?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the digital identity using Yubico’s
YubiKey are not a verified identity. The digital identity is self-sovereign.

•

Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity?
Yes, a claimed identity can be securely linked to a single, unique identity.

•

Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not
counterfeit or spoofed)?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity cannot be validated as
genuine.

•

Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity is not validated as existing in
the real world.
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The iterations of testing the digital identity on a YubiKey as it exists with Google’s
FIDO U2F brought the importance of the ZTA to the ICAM framework. Trust is the most
critical component in ensuring success in a PKI. In order to change the above no answers to
yes, the identity management component of the CSP was instantiated within the ICAM
framework.
The identity management component of the Issuance and Management Subsystem
identity proofing phases ensures that the entity or person is real by requiring the physical
presence and showing a valid form of identification such as a passport or driver’s license.
Connecting to database systems like the police or TSA officers use to check against
counterfeits provides evidence that the identity is genuine and exists in the real world. The
additional phases of identity management ensure ZTA throughout the lifecycle of an identity.
The CA’s as they currently operate do not have any formal oversight so are usually
only trusted within a business or organization. In order for all CA’s to be trusted by all
business’, governments, and individuals and to ensure no spoofing or counterfeiting of the
certificates, all CA’s are vetted and registered to a centralized certification authority as part of
the credential management component of the Issuance and Management Subsystem. This is
the root certificate or root of trust that signs the certificates that the distributed CA’s are
issued. The additional phases of the credential management component ensure trust
throughout the certificate’s lifecycle.
In order to provide defense in depth trust in identities, authorization to the various
systems, subsystems, and components of the Issuance and Management Subsystem, is only
provided if the user’s role requires it per the tenets of least privilege.
NFC
•

Can the encryption size be reduced to fit on an NFC card?
Yes, the YubiKey can use public key cryptography following FIPS AAL3
standards according to NIST SP800-63B guidelines.

•

Can a smartphone with NFC enabled be a smart card reader?
Yes, the smartphone could read the YubiKey every time with no problems.

•

Is there a secure communication channel between the card and device?
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Yes, on a Samsung Android device such as the one used for testing; Samsung
Knox provides direct control of the NFC chip embedded in the device. The
Knox Platform provides security hardening for every aspect of mobile device
operation. It enables trust on mobile endpoints with Samsung’s Real-Time
Kernel Protection (RKP) that is considered one of the best kernel protection
technologies available from any mobile device vendor (Samsung, 2019).
•

What drain is there on the battery life?
The mobile device used for testing was a Samsung Galaxy Note 10+. On this
device there was no noticeable drain on the battery life. The battery percentage
was documented within an excel spreadsheet at the start and end of an hour
period of using the YubiKey to log into various Google accounts. Some
differences could be attributed to receiving text messages or phone calls during
that hour time period. It seemed to remain steadily at 1% if no texts or phone
calls came in during the hour of testing.

Battery
Start
Battery
End
Usuage

Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Test 4

Test 5

Test 6

76.00%

96.00%

77.00%

72.00%

75.00%

86.00%

75.00%

94.00%

74.00%

71.00%

73.00%

85.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

1.00%

2.00%

1.00%

Table 4: Battery Life

Average

1.80%

Overall, the results showed that NFC is a viable option for updating PKI’s front-end to
allow functionality with mobile devices. The smart cards currently in use today Java 3 are
already capable of being both contact and contactless making it an easier transition away from
traditional PKI front-end usage. More details on how the YubiKey was installed and tested
can be found in Appendix A.
4.2

Digital Identities on Blockchain-Based PKI
Remme’s Protocol was used as the blockchain-based PKI. Only the free services of

Remme was utilized but it was enough to demonstrate that PKI can become a distributed system
with blockchain. REMChain is the first public blockchain to be built on top of Protocol.
REMChain is not open-source but its success demonstrates that blockchain-based PKI can
support millions of users, perform identity brokering, allow separate PKI systems from
competitors to work together, and provide a trusted third-party CA.

Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework

54

Background
I began using some source code from GitHub on pki-blockchain (wshbair &
alyakubov, 2019). The developers had created a Proof of Concept blockchain-based PKI
implementation. Starting with their code would be faster than starting from scratch and why
reinvent the wheel? In working with their code, I quickly realized that I would be very limited
in creating a network. In conducting more research, I learned about Remme. Remme is a
blockchain-based PKI protocol that can be used for issuing and managing public keys.
Remme core is built on Hyperledger Sawtooth platform and allows flexibility in language
choices during development. Remme also supports JS and .Net programming (Roman-tik,
2019 ).
The Remme protocol follows the X.509 standards for its public keys. The web server
authenticates its client with the help of certificates and the associated private key. The current
limitation is that the Remme Protocol on works on Ubuntu 18.04 (Remme, 2019).
Digital Identity
•

Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the
digital identity?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the digital identity using Remme are not a
verified identity. The digital identity is self-sovereign.

•

Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity?
Yes, a claimed identity can be securely linked to a single, unique identity.

•

Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not
counterfeit or spoofed)?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity cannot be validated as
genuine.

•

Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world?
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity is not validated as existing in
the real world.

To turn these no answers into a yes, it was found that Remme’s public key
cryptography was lacking similar qualities that the YubiKey does in regards to establishing a
trusted digital identity. In addition, the very public blockchain nature of Remme led to the
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ICAM framework being built on a private based blockchain. This ensures that only verified
entities are allowed access and permissions to make changes to the blockchain. Again, this is
following the tenets of ZTA. More details on how Remme was installed and tested can be
found in Appendix B.
Blockchain
•

Can PKI become a distributed system with blockchain?
Yes, running Remme’s tests showed that PKI can become distributed with
blockchain.

•

Can blockchain allow separate PKI systems to function as one?
Yes, theoretically it should allow separate PKI systems to function as one. This
is because Remme has been implemented within RemChain. RemChain being
a public blockchain has demonstrated success in separate PKI systems
functioning as one.

•

Can blockchain perform identity brokering?
Yes, RemChain proves successful in performing identity brokering but it does
not follow the tenets of ZTA

•

Can PKI systems from competitors be trusted?
No, not as RemChain or Remme currently exist due to a lack of vetting in
identities and the openness of the public blockchain

•

Can Blockchain-Based PKI provide a trusted identity for the internet?
Yes, with changes to the type of blockchain used and processes that follow
ZTA

•

Can blockchain provide a trusted third-party certification authority?
Yes, again with changes to the type of blockchain and ZTA

•

Can the size of the blockchain be hosted by enough peers?
Unsure of size limit. The blockchain testing worked well with numbers up to
10,000 blocks. The size did not reach the numbers it might when the entire
internet works together to form a trusted web. More testing needs to be
performed in future work.
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In order for the blockchain-based PKI to form a web of trust, the tenets of ZTA needed to be
implemented within the ICAM framework. A private, permissioned blockchain was chosen in
order to ensure trust in the entities accessing the blockchain and making modifications. Roles
will be limited based on least privilege separation of duties. For example, a VA system would
only be allowed to authenticate and authorize an entity based on their certifications and
permissions granted. The VA would only be allowed to read the revoked blockchain and not
make any changes.
4.3

Future Work
The next step for the theoretical ICAM framework is to find a company to be the client

as part of Technical Action Research (TAR). The researcher plays three roles: designer, helper,
and researcher. The researcher desires to learn something about a technique by using it to help
a client. Technology drives TAR not problems. In TAR, a client with an experimental artifact
is the object of study. Therefore, a client uses the ICAM framework as the artifact and provides
the funding to implement a real world blockchain-based PKI using NFC.
Instead of relying on Yubikeys actual Java 3 cards programmed specifically for the
ICAM framework need to be used. The Java 3 card provides contact and contactless capabilities
allowing the card to continue working with existing systems while making room for updating
the system. Rather than using Remme for the blockchain-based PKI it must be created from
scratch or start with one such as Fluree because a distributed permission blockchain-based PKI
system needs to be established. This is distributed because all participating parties in the ICAM
framework system need to work together and form a cohesive system of trust among each other.
Permissioned blockchains maintain trust by only allowing certain actions to be performed by
participants identified as needing to perform those actions. This ensures the tenets of zero trust
are being followed.
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CHAPTER 5
5

CONCLUSIONS

“Closing the identity gap is an enormous challenge. It will take the work of many
committed people and organizations coming together across different geographies, sectors and
technologies. But it’s exciting to imagine a world where safe and secure digital identities are
possible, providing everyone with an essential building blocks to every right and opportunity
they deserve.” – Peggy Johnson Executive VP, Business Development, Microsoft Corporation
Industry and government want to know who is on their networks and what they are
doing while on them. People want to trust that the person they are talking with online is who
they say they are and that the email is actually from the company it claims to be. The only way
to achieve this is through trusted digital identities. The PKI systems that worked so well in the
20th century do not meet the mobile demands of the 21st century.
In today’s dynamic world, PKI must become distributed and identity must be digitized
in such a manner that an individual feel assured they have control over their personal data. As
identity and security were an afterthought of the internet, safely maneuvering cyberspace relies
on frameworks that will provide the needed infrastructure to protect an individual’s, an
industry’s, and government’s data. Blockchain-based PKI opens the door to a standard that
allows everyone willing to participate to run on a federated infrastructure. This enables PKI to
truly be a “public” system. Governments and industry following the same set of standards
utilizing certificates signed by the same root certificate authority can all belong to the
permission based blockchain where their CSPs are part of the distributed network. The ICAM
Framework provides updates to PKI that establishes a digital identity for our mobile world that
no other framework has given.
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APPENDIX A: YUBIKEY
YubiKey 5 NFC
YubiKey is really easy to set up to use to protect Google accounts. I’ve set mine up to
use with all of my accounts. I utilize the Yubikey on both my desktop and my mobile device.
Turn on 2-Step Verification
First turn on 2-step verification. Go to your google account and on the left navigation
panel, click security. On the signing in to Google panel, click 2-step verification (Google,
2019).

Figure 16: YubiKey 5 NFC

Add a Security Key
While logged into your Google account, go to Security Key under 2-Step.
Click Add Security Key.
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Figure 17: Add Security Key
Choose USB or Bluetooh security key from the list.
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Figure 18: Choose Your Security Key

Next you’ll be asked to ensure your YubiKey is with you but not connected. Then
click next.
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Figure 19: Ensure YubiKey is with you but not connected

When prompted insert your YubiKey into a USB port on the computer. Then touch the
gold disk that is lit up on your YubiKey.
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Figure 20: Instructions to register YubiKey
Your YubiKey will be registered. Assign a name for your Yubikey and click done.
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Figure 21: Security Key Registered

Logging into Your Google Account
Now that a security key is registered with your google account, to log in on a
computer you insert your Yubikey and touch it. To log in from a mobile device, you just tap
your YubiKey (Yubico, 2019).
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APPENDIX B: REMME
Installing Remme
All previous version of Remme Protocol must be uninstalled before installing again.
Uninstall Binaries
$ sudo dpkg -r remnode

Step 1: Install Binaries
On Ubuntu 18.04:
$ wget
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol/releases/download/v0.1.0/remmeprotocol_0.1.0ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb && \
sudo dpkg -i ./remmeprotocol_0.1.0-ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb

Step 2: Boot node and wallet
Start remvault
$

remvault &

You will see an output similar to the one below:
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.388 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625

add_handler

] add

add_handler

] add

api url: /v1/remvault/stop
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/node/get_supported_apis
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault wallet_api_plugin.cpp:73

plugin_startup

]

starting wallet_api_plugin
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625

add_handler

] add

add_handler

] add

add_handler

] add

api url: /v1/wallet/create
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/wallet/create_key
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/wallet/get_public_keys
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Press enter to continue.
Start remnode
This command loads all the basic plugins, set the server address, enable CORS (with
no restrictions and development logging) and add some contract debugging and logging.
$ remnode -e -p rem \
--plugin eosio::producer_plugin \
--plugin eosio::chain_api_plugin \
--plugin eosio::http_plugin \
--access-control-allow-origin='*' \
--contracts-console \
--http-validate-host=false \
--verbose-http-errors >> remnode.log 2>&1 &
Note: In the above configuration, CORS is enabled for * for development purposes only, you
should never enable CORS for * on a node that is publicly accessible!
Step 3: check that remnode is producing blocks
Run the following command:
tail -f remnode.log
You will see an output similar to the one below:
1929001ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366974ce4e2a... #13929 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:09.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13928, confirmed: 0]
1929502ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366aea085023... #13930 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:09.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13929, confirmed: 0]
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block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366b7f074fdd... #13931 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:10.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13930, confirmed: 0]
1930501ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366cd8222adb... #13932 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:10.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13931, confirmed: 0]
1931002ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366d5c1ec38d... #13933 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:11.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13932, confirmed: 0]
1931501ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366e45c1f235... #13934 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:11.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13933, confirmed: 0]
1932001ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000366f98adb324... #13935 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:12.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13934, confirmed: 0]
1932501ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

00003670a0f01daa... #13936 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:12.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13935, confirmed: 0]
1933001ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

00003671e8b36e1e... #13937 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:13.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13936, confirmed: 0]
1933501ms thread-0 producer_plugin.cpp:585

block_production_loo ] Produced block

0000367257fe1623... #13938 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:13.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib:
13937, confirmed: 0]
Press ctrl + c to close an output.
Step 4: Check the Wallet
Run the following command, we need to validate the installation and check if wallet is
working as intended:
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$ remcli wallet list
You will see an output similar to the one below:
$ Wallets:
[]
Step 5: Check remnode endpoints
Run the following command, this will check that the RPC API is working correctly:
$ curl http://localhost:8888/v1/chain/get_info
Installing Testchain
Step 1: install binaries
Previous versions need to be uninstalled before installing. On Ubuntu 18.04:
$ wget
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol/releases/download/v0.1.0/remmeprotocol_0.1.0ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb && \
sudo dpkg -i ./remmeprotocol_0.1.0-ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb

Step 2: boot node and wallet
Start remvault:
$ remvault &

You will see an output similar to the one below:
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.388 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625

add_handler

] add

add_handler

] add

api url: /v1/remvault/stop
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/node/get_supported_apis
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault wallet_api_plugin.cpp:73

plugin_startup

]

starting wallet_api_plugin
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/wallet/create

add_handler

] add
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info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625

73
add_handler

] add

add_handler

] add

api url: /v1/wallet/create_key
info 2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault http_plugin.cpp:625
api url: /v1/wallet/get_public_keys
Press enter to continue
Step 3: Download testchain settings
$ wget https://testchain.remme.io/genesis.json

Step 4: Create Configuration File
Create data and config folders.
$ mkdir data && mkdir config
Create config/config.ini and put the following settings into it:
plugin = eosio::chain_api_plugin
plugin = eosio::net_api_plugin
http-server-address = 0.0.0.0:8888
p2p-listen-endpoint = 0.0.0.0:9876
p2p-peer-address = 167.71.88.152:9877
verbose-http-errors = true
These config options should get you into the basic operation mode with your node API
available at port 8888 . P2p-peer-address points to the other nodes where to fetch the new
blocks from (you may specify multiple entries, 167.71.88.152 is the address of a node hosted
by Remme ).
Start remnode
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$ remnode --config-dir ./config/ --data-dir ./data/ --delete-all-blocks --genesis-json
genesis.json
$ remnode --config-dir ./config/ --data-dir ./data/ >> remnode.log 2>&1 &
The command above will run the node in the background and will save its output to
the

remnode.log

file. At this point, you must be ready to start and connect your node to the

network. If your node is connected and synced, this command should return you the
information about the chain:
$ remcli get info
{
“server_version”: “96796929”,
“chain_id”:
“93ece941df27a5787a405383a66a7c26d04e80182adf504365710331ac0625a7”,
“head_block_num”: 680455,
“last_irreversible_block_num”: 680121,
“last_irreversible_block_id”:
“000a60b93d787895c905e36d7cf8d37a2bbed21d6f4b04f55645aefe459a32c0”,
“head_block_id”:
“000a62074d3b6919262d90beecdffcc021fca03dc9ecd01ce4bfb91f8af36720”,
“head_block_time”: “2019-08-12T15:08:58.500”,
“head_block_producer”: “remproduce21”,
…
}
remcli

(analog of cleos in EOSIO terms) is a command-line tool that has a rich

variety of functions. It has nearly everything that you may need to interact with the
blockchain. You may start getting familiar with it by running

remcli –help .

Step 5: Become a Block Producer
To become a block producer you need to register your account via a system smart
contract by calling the action

regproducer ,

vote for someone or yourself, set up your node as
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a full node (described above) and prepare it for block production (so it starts to produce
blocks in case you make it to the

top21 ).

$ remcli system regproducer YOURACCOUNTNAME YOURPUBLICKEY
https://yourdomain.com
$ remcli system voteproducer prods YOURACCOUNTNAME YOURACCOUNTNAME
In your node config file, add these options:
plugin = eosio::producer_plugin
plugin = eosio::producer_api_plugin
producer-name = YOURACCOUNTNAME
signature-provider = YOURPUBLICKEY=KEY:YOURPRIVATEKEY
Once you run remnode, these config options should get you into block producer
operation mode with your node. Once your block producer account gets into the top21 list,
your node will automatically start producing blocks. Please pay attention that on the contrary
to

EOS

network,

Block Producers

on

testchain

are required to validate the token swaps

between the chains and have to run an additional bot (along the
external blockchains (e.g.

remnode )

that monitors

Ethereum ).

Token swap
Download sources:
$ git clone -b block-producer-swap-bot --single-branch
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol.git && \
cd remprotocol/block_producer_swap_bot
If you use

Ubuntu 18.04 ,

install dependencies with the following command

$ sudo ./scripts/ubuntu18.04_install.sh
Create configuration file with the following command:
$ nano ./config.ini
Paste into the config file the following content:
[NODES]
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remnode=127.0.0.1:8888
eth-provider=wss://ropsten.infura.io/ws/v3/<your infura id>
[REM]
swap-permission=<permission to authorize init swap actions>@active
swap-private-key=<private key to sign init swap actions>
Replace remnode, eth-provider, swap-permission, swap-private-key with your
remnode host and port, a link to Ethereum node with websocket connection, your account and
private key to authorize init swap actions (for example your block producer account name and
private key for signing blocks). Tutorial for creating Infura API key.
Save config file with Ctrl+O. Press Enter. Close config file with Ctrl+X.
To start approving swaps run the following command:
$ sudo ./scripts/run.sh >> swap.log 2>&1 &
Monitoring
Another option to check if your node has completed a correct setup is through
monitoring. While starting the node, the monitoring has also been installed and started.
Completing this step is required.
Monitoring is a process of tracking application performance to detect and prevent
issues that could occur with your application on a particular server. For the monitoring, we
will use

ELK stack .

It is an open source, feature-rich metrics dashboard and graph editor

stack.
Step 1: install Docker
Ubuntu
$ curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add && \
sudo add-apt-repository "deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu
$(lsb_release -cs) stable" && \
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install docker-ce -y && \
sudo curl -o /usr/local/bin/docker-compose -L
"https://github.com/docker/compose/releases/download/1.23.2/docker-compose-$(uname -s)$(uname -m)" && \
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sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-compose
Step 2: start the project
Download the project and start it with the following command:
$ git clone https://github.com/Remmeauth/protocol-monitoring && \
cd protocol-monitoring && \
sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml up -d && \
curl -X POST "localhost:5601/api/saved_objects/_import" -H "kbn-xsrf: true" --form
file=@export.ndjson
Step 3: visualization and graphs

Figure 22: Visualizations and Graphs on Dashboard
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On confirming the stack is started, navigate to Kibana at http://<ip-address>:5601. To see
visualization and graphs, go to Dashboards -> [Metricbeat System] Host overview ECS.
Dashboards
The toll named Metricbeat collects the following data: filesystem per host, system overview,
CPU, filesystem, memory, network, overview, processes.
Technical notes
The following summarizes some important technical considerations:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

The Elasticsearch instances uses a named volume esdata for data persistence between
restarts. It exposes HTTP port 9200 for communication with other containers.
Environment variable defaults can be found in the file .env.
The Elasticsearch container has its memory limited to 1g. This can be adjusted using
the environment parameter ES_MEM_LIMIT. Elasticsearch has a heap size of 1g. This
can be adjusted through the environment variable ES_JVM_HEAP and should be set to
50% of the ES_MEM_LIMIT. Users may wish to adjust this value on smaller machines.
The Elasticsearch password can be set via the environment variable ES_PASSWORD.
This sets the password for the Elastic and Kibana user.
The Kibana container exposes the port 5601.
All configuration files can be found in the extracted folder ./config.
The Metricbeat container mounts both /proc and /sys/fs/cgroup on Linux. This
allows Metricbeat to use the system module report on disk, memory, network and cpu
of the host.
On systems with POSIX file permissions, all Beats configuration files are subject to
ownership and file permission checks. The purpose of these checks is to prevent
unauthorized users from providing or modifying configurations that are run by the Beat.
The owner of the configuration file must be either root or the user who is executing
the Beat process. The permissions on the file must disallow writes by anyone other than
the owner. As we mount our configurations from the host, where the user is likely
different than that used to run the container and the beat process, we disable this check
for all beats with -strict.perms=false.

Customizing the Stack
With respect to the current example, we have provided a few simple entry points for
customization:
•

The example includes an .env file listing environment variables which alter the
behaviour of the stack. These environment variables allow the user to change:
o ELASTIC_VERSION - the Elastic Stack version (default 7.2.0)
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o ES_PASSWORD - the password used for authentication with the elastic
user. This password is applied for all system users
i.e. kibana and logstash_system. Defaults to changeme.
o DEFAULT_INDEX_PATTERN - The index pattern used as the default
in Kibana. Defaults to metricbeat-*.
o ES_MEM_LIMIT The
memory
limit
used
for
the Elasticsearch container. Defaults to 1g. Consider reducing for
smaller machines.
o ES_JVM_HEAP - The Elasticsearch JVM heap size. Defaults to 1024m
and should be set to half of the ES_MEM_LIMIT.
Modules and Configuration - All configuration to the containers is provided through a
mounted ./config directory. Where possible, this exploits the dynamic configuration
loading capabilities of Beats. For example, an additional module could be added by
simply adding a file to the directory ./config/beats/metricbeat/modules.d/ in the required
format.

Shutting down the stack
The following command will exit the containers and ensure they are shut down gracefully.
$ sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml stop
To remove all containers, including their mounted named volumes, use the following
command:
$ sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml down -v

